million deaths. 3 Finally, lessons from West and Central Africa could be a harbinger for Zimbabwe and southern Africa.
Two factors contribute to state collapse and its contagion effect. One is an inside-out and the other an outside-in process. From the inside, successive rulers of what are now collapsed states weakened that state through neo-patrimonial rule. 4 As
Christopher Clapham argues, while we must not over-generalize, in Sub-Sahara Africa there are a "… distressingly large number of states in which acceptable political formulae have not been developed, and that remain vulnerable to collapse, or have actually collapsed." 5 The states were not only unable to develop a stable political system but lacked administrative capacity to govern effectively and to ignite sustainable economic development. The weakness of the Africa state was most obvious in the periphery of those states. Thus, while the core of the state, typically centered on the capital, weakens through mismanagement and political failure, pressure from the periphery force in on that center and caused state collapse.
Political scientists labeled Sub-Saharan African states quasi states, 6 because, while they had a patina of statehood (such as a seat at the U.N) and formal recognition of their sovereignty (such as by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)) they were not fully functional states. They had international legitimacy but little or no domestic legitimacy. Over time, successive rulers of these states used their power and position for the advancement and enrichment of themselves and a small coterie of clients, often defined by tribal or ethnic affinity. For instance, public corporations, or parastatals, were used to rig markets to gather rents for the rulers and their clients. This inside-out process of state decay gathers most of the attention in the press and in academic and policy studies, but it is only part of the story. There is an important regional dimension -an historically contingent outside-in process that has contributed to the development of dysfunctional states, their collapse, and regional instability. 
From the outside-in
Africa's post-independence rulers inherited artificial states created as a compromise among the European colonial powers at the Berlin conference of 1885; most revealingly about 45% of all African boundaries are straight lines that either correspond to an astrological measurement or are parallel to some other set of straight lines. The first cohort of post-independent African rulers accepted these borders and agreed to what was in effect a patrimonial pact among themselves at the founding of the OAU.
During the Cold War, while the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. supported proxy wars within the borders of these states, they were nonetheless careful to limit cross-border conflict. In extreme cases, the superpowers pumped resources into the corrupt patrimonial governments in return for their political support, and in many cases this support was the lifeblood of these regimes. With the end of the Cold War, this support was sometimes suddenly withdrawn further weakening the quasi-state. The fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa -be they precolonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent era -has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people.
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Over time, and as their patrimonial resources shrank, the rulers had even more difficulty projecting authority into the periphery of their countries, to say nothing of providing public goods. In the case of the DRC, for instance, only 15 percent of the roads inherited from Belgian colonial rule were still passable twentyfive years later. 13 The combination of weak states and unsecured hinterlands is the cause of state collapse and its spread. The result is borders that literally bleed into each other. The contagion of state collapse has swept across much of West and Central Africa. Liberia has infected much of West Africa. The instability in the DRC spills across its borders into East Africa and it threatens the relatively stable sub-continent of southern Africa. Zimbabwe is in imminent peril. Doe used his tenure of government to plunder the countries wealth blatantly and brutally; after the bloody suppression of a coup attempt by his rival Thomas Quiwonkpa in 1985, he resorted to a particularly poisonous from of ethnic manipulation which was to have consequences in the ethnic pogroms of 1990.
The classic cases: Liberia and the DRC
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With the end of the Cold War Doe could no longer depend on the patronage of the U.S., which was even greater than that given to his predecessor. U.S. aid finally ended in 1988 with Doe's failure to pay $7 million in arrears on a military loan. 20 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank followed suite by cutting off access to their funds. All it would take to collapse the state was pressure from the outside. came to power in the wake of secessionist pressures in the periphery -Katanga, and was forced out of power by the ADFL, which marched to Kinshasa from the same area. 34 As noted above, Zaire had always struggled with the mineral rich areas in its periphery: Shaba (Katanga), rich in copper; Eastern Zaire, gold, coltan, and agriculture; and East Kasai, industrial diamonds. The last of these had even established an independent monetary system and its own university.
As with Liberia, the role of regional actors did not end with the overthrow of the regime. Uganda and Rwanda turned against Kabila, because they wanted a buffer between themselves and the Interahamwe (Hutu militia along their borders) and ex-Mobutu forces. Laurent Kabila and his successor, Joseph Kabila, responded to the threat from Uganda and Rwanda by allying with Zimbabwe, Angola, Nambia, Chad, and Sudan. In most of these cases, this alliance took the form of transnational patrimonial networks feeding off and fueling the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in the DRC's periphery.
The transborder nature of the DRC collapse is even more complex than Liberia's, possibly because of its geographical position -it borders on nine states. In August 1998, fighting erupted again. This time, Rwanda and Uganda supported different factions, each trying to protect its northwest frontier with the DRC. By mid-1999, rebel movements controlled one third of the DRC, and the rebel movement, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), had split into three groups. 35 The FGOR formed an alliance with Hutu militia in Burundi. As stated above, Uganda and Rwanda had proxies in the DRC.
Profit, not necessarily territorial gain, is the motive. The quadrangle comprising Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo, has four major trading routes. The first carried agricultural and manufactured goods between Kampala and Bukavu (DRC); the second is for goods and people between the port-city of Bujumbura in 33 For a thorough chronology of these events see Reed, "Guerrillas in the Midst," pp. 140-144. 34 Reno, Warlord Politics, p. 174. Burundi and the port of Uvira (DRC); the third moves between the Oriental Province of Congo directly to Uganda; and the fourth crosses Lake Tanganyika to port towns of Kalemie in Congo and Kigoma in Tanzania and between Lubumbashi in Congo and Dar-es-Salaam, via Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia. The collapse of the DRC has allowed neighboring countries to control much of this trade, even as it originates in the DRC. The Uganda backed Rassenblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) have control over much of the gold and coffee producing areas of Eastern Zaire. The Rwandan backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), while not in control of vast mineral resources, collect fees from local producers and Lebanese intermediaries, and control much of Kisangani's palm oil business, which is exported to Kigali via military planes. Finally, Rwanda and its RCD allies have resorted to twinning Congolese and Rwandan cities, and Rwanda plans to set up an export processing zone along the DRC border.
In both the cases of Liberia and the DRC, insurgencies that started in the periphery relatively quickly captured the capital; in both cases, they left the shell of a state in their wake and anarchy in the peripheries. In both cases, the remnants of various armies have fractured into warlord armies: in Liberia, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia home to the minority ethnic Ndebele who had supported Mugabe's rival, Joshua Nkoma. Up to 10,000 civilians were killed. 37 However, Mugabe, like Tubman, Doe, and Taylor in Liberia and Mobutu in Zaire, has created a corrupt patrimonial system that has systematically hollowed out the Zimbabwean state. This is no mean achievement for a state that was born in 1980 as Sub-Sahara Africa's second most industrialized. Politically, Mugabe has ruled atop a one party state for almost two decades. Political and institutional decay has accelerated in the last few years as he has made sure the Supreme Court was compliant, rigged elections, and jailed opponents. But as Robert Rotberg has argued, it is the convergence of economic and political decay that signals imminent collapse. 38 The economy is in ruin.
The 2004 tobacco crop, Zimbabwe's prime export (accounting for 30% of foreign earning), is projected to be 45.5% lower than the previous year.
39 And the year before was not very good. Agricultural production in general has steadily declined since Mugabe's government sanctioned land seizure beginning in 2000. Of the people who got good arable land, 99.2 percent are cabinet ministers, wives, political cronies, relatives, and girlfriends of the Mugabe administration. 40 The UN World Food Program estimates that 5.5 million Zimbabweans will face acute shortages of food, almost half the population. 41 Other parts of the economy have been affected by the decaying state. In the spring of 2003, there were mass job "stayaways" and in April the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions staged labor action. There are shortages of fuel, electricity, and cash. Unemployment is at about 75%, and inflation is expected to reach 1000%.
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The health care system, once along with South Africa's by far the best in Africa, is in disarray -fewer than 900 doctors remain in a country of 11.6 million, one for every 13,500 people. 43 Meanwhile, prior to the last election, Mugabe purchased 19 expensively armored limousines and he is putting the finishing touches on a 130,000 square foot palace north Harare for about nine million (US) dollars. 44 But, the political nature of the Zimbabwean patrimonial system is an African anomaly -and this is the key to understanding the threat of state collapse there. While most post-independent African rulers got their support from an urban elite, Mugabe has depended on strong support from the countryside and his ex-comrades in arms. The opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) dominates the urban centers of Zimbabwe, as did earlier challenges to ZANU rule by the Zimbabwe Unity Movement in 1990 and by the Forum Party in 1995. Mugabe's regime has responded by using the land issue to shore up its rural base and to reward cronies, particularly military leaders. Mugabe also established a national youth training program in 2001, know as the "green bombers"; they serve as an informal party militia. Like the RUF in Sierra Leone, they enlist children soldiers and hold women in the Youth Service camps as sexual servants.
45
The risk of state failure in Zimbabwe, nonetheless, is not from the perpetuation of ZANU-PF rule, but the displacement of one patrimonial system with another, similar to what happened in Zambia. When the Zambian labor leader Frederick Chiluba was elected in 1991 as leader of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), a new era of democracy and development was proclaimed. Instead, Chiluba ruled much as had his predecessor, Kenneth Kaunda, who had headed the one party state since Zambian independence in 1964. Chiluba even jailed Kaunda and nine other members of his party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). After a coup attempt in 1997, the government declared a 90-day state of emergency.
The greater threat to Zimbabwe would be if the MDC becomes the ruling party and systematically dismantles the old patron client system and replaces it with one of its own making. This, of course, does not have to happen. But, if the transition is not closely monitored, Zimbabwe would tragically come to resemble Liberia, where an elite has control over the urban area(s), and well armed disgruntled factions patrol the periphery. There has already been violence between ZANU and the MDC and more than a hundred have died in the last three years and thousands seriously injured. In fact, after their success in parliamentary elections in 2003, rural areas were no-go for the MDC. 46 As with Liberia and the DRC there is a regional dimension. Although Mozambique has been at peace, there would be opportunities for ex-ZANU soldiers and militia to join forces with the remnants of Mozambique rebels, even with ones they once fought, as is common in Liberia. Finally, if the MDC were to come to power, intra-party factionalism and competition within the ZANU-PF, such as between the Zezuru and Karanga factions, could become violent and each would be well funded. 52 The point is that 
Lessons not learned
The lessons of state collapse in West and Central Africa and the threat to Zimbabwe are complex, but the international community's response has been simplistic. There has been too much focus on stitching together vagabond governments in the capitals of collapsed states to displace the disgraced or defeated regimes. For instance, the internationally brokered plan for Liberia in the wake of Taylor's abdication and retreat to Nigeria is essentially a patrimonial bargain among warring factions, including two rebel groups. Each group has inherited portfolios in the new government that translates into control of state generated rents. As these groups become less satisfied with their share of the bounty, they can return to their origins in the periphery. A similar bargain was made in Sierra Leone, which had a disastrous result.
A long historical process, almost a "perfect storm," that transcends the colonial and post-colonial eras has created weak African states that have no immune systems to protect them from the contagion of states collapse in contiguous states. border smuggling is on the rise. Again, the lesson is that a new government in the capital will do little to fix the problem. The problem is usually hundreds of miles away.
Fixing the states of Sub-Sahara Africa will entail fixing the regions. Conflict continues to come from the outside-in. In fact, in an ironic historical twist, the inability of pre-colonial African states to broadcast authority into the periphery was partially because the land was not valuable. Today, the portable wealth of the peripheries coupled with its exploding population growth (caused by refugee movements) is fueling the conflicts. This means focusing as much attention of the outside-in causes of collapse as on the inside-out causes. It means a reallocation of resources, including regional peacekeeping and UN peacekeeping forces to the periphery. It means paying attention to the cross border networks that continue to make the penumbras of these weak states no man lands, and that continue to be the fountainheads of insurgency and instability. Finally, it means ending three eras of exclusive state building form the inside-out.
